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 SUMMARY
 In this paper we use nonparametric and semiparametnrc estimation procedures to analyse
 whether the restart programme in the UK has had any effect on reducing unemployment
 duration. The restart programme consists of an interview of the long-term unemployed to
 counsel them on effective job search. The statistical results utilize experimental data in
 which a control group does not receive the restart interview. The results show that the
 programme has had a significant effect (for the treatment group) of reducing the duration
 of unemployment. However, if we distinguish between exits to 'any job' and to full-time
 jobs lasting at least 3 months we find that the treatment group is no different from the
 control group in exits to 'stable jobs'.
 Keywords: COX DURATION MODEL WITH FLEXIBLE BASE-LINE HAZARD; DURATION OF
 UNEMPLOYMENT; EXPERIMENTAL STATISTICAL POLICY EVALUATION; RESTART
 PROGRAMME
 1. INTRODUCTION
 Finding policies which are effective in securing transitions to full-time stable jobs for
 the long-term unemployed is a central part of the UK unemployment problem. Since
 a high proportion of the long-term unemployed are itinerant non-workers whose
 labour market history is characterized by long periods of unemployment punctuated
 only by occasional spells of work in temporary or part-time jobs, policy measures
 like the restart programme, which may help them to break out of the cycle of
 recurrent unemployment, could be very important. The question addressed in this
 study is whether the programme has succeeded in helping the long-term unemployed
 to secure full-time 'stable' jobs or whether instead it has been mainly effective in
 pushing people off the unemployment register, or into training programmes or part-
 time and temporary jobs. Such a distinction is important since it is more likely that
 securing a regular job will end the dependence of the unemployed person on state
 welfare payments.
 The problem of repeated spells of unemployment has been extensively examined
 by many other researchers (see for example Heckman and Borjas (1980)). The link
 between the likelihood of unemployment and job types has also been recognized in
 'dual labour market theories' (Dickens and Lang, 1985). We seek to analyse this
 dichotomy further by distinguishing between types of job obtained following a spell
 of unemployment. In particular we examine exits out of unemployment into 'any job'
 and exits into 'stable jobs' where the latter concentrates only on exits to jobs which
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 are full time and last at least 3 months. If the restart initiative simply moves people
 off the unemployment register into a short-term alternative, so that they return to
 unemployment a few months later, then this may be an important indictment of the
 restart programme.
 Although studies of labour market policies in the USA are increasingly using
 experimental data (LaLonde, 1985; Johnson and Klepinger, 1994) most empirical
 statistical studies in UK social science, including those concerned with evalu-
 ating government programmes, are non-experimental. (The exception is Royston
 (1983, 1984).) As a consequence they have encountered problems with non-random
 selection into such programmes. The resulting sample selection bias can severely
 contaminate estimates of the programme's effectiveness. The use of controlled
 experiments has been advocated as a means of overcoming this problem. Our study
 evaluates the restart programme by using data on the long-term unemployed based
 on a controlled experiment in which a purely random group of workers was excluded
 from the restart interview. It is the presence of such a control group that allows us to
 obtain unbiased estimates of the 'treatment effect' of the restart programme in
 altering the unemployment patterns of participants.
 The restart programme was introduced by the government in April 1987 to review
 the position of people experiencing long-term unemployment. This section describes
 how the system worked at the time that our data were collected. The programme
 consisted of a set of six-monthly meetings between the unemployed individual and a
 counsellor. During this interview the counsellor assessed the claimant's recent
 unemployment history and offered advice on benefits, search behaviour, training
 courses and in some instances initiated direct contact with employers. The main aim
 of the restart process was to help the unemployed to return to full-time stable
 employment thereby reducing the amount of time that people spend unemployed and
 hence reducing their claims of unemployment benefit. The programme also aimed to
 reduce welfare claims by exposing those not available for work and those not making
 appropriate efforts to find employment. It is this threat component which may induce
 people to accept temporary or part-time jobs simply to escape the attentions of the
 restart officer.
 The process begins when the restart office sends a letter to each individual who is
 approaching an unbroken period of 6 months claiming unemployment benefit. The
 letter requests that the individual attends an interview at a stated date and time.
 Interviews take place in Employment Service Job Centres and last approximately 1 5-
 25 minutes. At the time that our data were collected the benefit office, where claims
 were made and payments received, was distinct from the Employment Service Job
 Centre where restart interviews took place and where information on job vacancies
 and training programmes was provided. In some instances individuals were excused
 attendance at the restart interview mainly because they had already obtained a job,
 or a place on a training programme or had withdrawn their benefit claim. On
 completing the interview the restart counsellors then recommended a course of action
 designed to help that individual in their job search. Attendance at the restart
 interview was mandatory, in that it was a condition of receiving unemployment
 benefits that claimants attend an employment interview when asked to do so.
 Recent research has suggested that the restart programme is important in making
 people leave unemployment more quickly than they would otherwise do without the
 programme (Dolton and O'Neill, 1996). However, that work did not distinguish
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 between the type of jobs which people exited to. This paper investigates such a
 distinction by considering two definitions of the exit state to explore whether the
 receipt of a restart interview has a different effect for exit to any job whether full or
 part time (however little time it lasts) and exit to a stable job.
 In the context of duration data it is also important to distinguish the point in time
 at which the two groups become distinct, if and when they do. In Section 3 we utilize
 the nonparametric methods of Dinse et al. (1993) to facilitate this. In Section 4 we
 estimate a Cox proportional hazards model to investigate further the difference
 between the prospects of the control and treatment groups in finding stable jobs. In
 these estimations we control for differences in human capital and personal charac-
 teristics, explore the possible presence of unobserved heterogeneity and estimate a
 Meyer (1990) type of flexible base-line hazard.
 The main finding of the paper is that, although the restart programme has
 succeeded in moving people off the unemployment register by inducing them to take
 any job, it has been less successful in terms of moving people into long-term stable
 employment.
 2. DATA
 In 1989 the Policy Studies Institute was commissioned by the Employment Service
 to evaluate the effect of the restart initiative (White and Lakey, 1992). This study
 identified a sample of individuals approaching their sixth month of unemployment in
 the period March-July 1989 who were eligible for a restart interview. A random
 sample of 8925 of these individuals was chosen to take part in the study. Individuals
 were retained in the sample even if they subsequently did not attend a scheduled
 interview; therefore the sample is one of the inflow to the restart programme and not
 the outflow from it. Every Employment Service office throughout Britain was
 contacted while constructing the sample to eliminate regional biases. Individuals
 were selected for the sample from the inflow lists on the basis of the last three digits
 of their national insurance (NI) numbers. An NI digit sequence known to result in a
 random 5% sample was used to construct our data. In this sample a control group of
 582 people was randomly chosen, again by means of previously specified NI digit
 sequences. Members of the control group, although eligible for an interview, were
 not asked to attend the initial restart interview. For each individual in the sample,
 data were collected on personal characteristics such as sex and age as well as
 information on the restart interview and outcome. About 6 months after the restart
 interview, the survey organization, Social and Community Planning Research,
 conducted a survey of these individuals in which detailed information was obtained
 on subsequent work history, personal characteristics, the restart interview, previous
 employment history, job search behaviour and benefit income. Of the original
 sample, 5200 individuals completed this survey, which was conducted between
 September and October 1989. Of these, 3242 also entered the second survey carried
 out approximately 6 months after the first. For these individuals information from
 the second survey was used to extend their unemployment histories. Approximately
 half of the non-responses resulted from an inability to contact the individual because
 of invalid address records or death, whereas the other half refused to take part in the
 survey. Estimates of a probit equation determining survey participation suggest that
 the decision to participate was independent of control group status. Of the 5200
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 respondents, 4552 reported valid data on the variables of interest of which 286 were
 members of the control group.
 As already explained the data that we use are virtually unique in having an
 experimental control group, who were chosen randomly to be excluded from the
 restart interview. Since some of our sample never exit unemployment the techniques
 which we use must take into account the censored nature of the dependent variable.
 It was also possible to link an individual's geographical location to data on labour
 market conditions in an individual's travel-to-work area via the national on-line
 manpower information system. This allows us to obtain monthly data on local
 labour market conditions dating back to August 1985. A description of the variables
 used in this study along with summary statistics are presented in Appendix A and
 Table 3 there.
 3. NONPARAMETRIC DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA
 In this section we examine whether durations of unemployment for those in the
 treatment group are distinct from those in the control group for our various defini-
 tions of what constitutes a completed spell in unemployment. From the outset of our
 analysis we should be clear about the nature of the exit state which defines the end of
 an unemployment spell. Our central concern is to distinguish between the any job
 exit, the stable job exit and the censoring process used in the construction of these
 durations.
 The first obvious query is why we choose to define a stable job as a job which lasts
 at least 3 months. To some extent the choice of the time interval over which a job is
 judged to be stable is arbitrary. However, our choice is based on two commonly used
 criteria: the first is that the most generous condition for termination by either party
 in a job hiring contract is for the job to end on 3 months' notice (from either party);
 the second is that current unemployment benefit eligibility rules allow an unem-
 ployed person to try out a job (in the 'employment on trial' scheme) for up to 3
 months during which they can quit without losing their entitlement to benefit. To
 examine the robustness of our findings to our choice of 3 months we also carried out
 all our analysis by using a 4-month definition of stable job, which only strengthened
 our findings.
 We should also be clear about the precise form of the censoring process. It is
 possible to characterize the outcomes of exit from unemployment in these data as
 either entry to a job, entry to a training programme or signing off claiming unem-
 ployment benefit. In computing durations to any job or a stable job we must decide
 how to treat those exiting unemployment for other reasons. For these durations we
 consider that those who exited to 'signing off' are censored at the point that they
 declared themselves to be no longer looking for a job, by signing off. Since many of
 these people may not want to work or be available for work after signing off it
 seemed unreasonable to judge the restart initiative on its ability to place such
 individuals. For those who exited to training we subtracted their time spent in
 training from their duration of unemployment on the grounds that they were not still
 unemployed and were taking active steps to find a job. However, since they had not
 yet found a job they could not be judged to have a completed unemployment spell.
 Furthermore, in constructing duration to a stable job, exits to part-time jobs or jobs
 lasting less than 3 months are included as time spent unemployed. To examine the
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 sensitivity of our results to these assumptions we repeated all the statistical analysis
 which follows for a data set which excluded those exiting to signing off and a data
 set which counted training time (as well as time spent signing off) as time in
 unemployment. All our results are robust to these changes.
 Of central concern in this study is the comparison of the survival distributions of
 unemployment times for two groups: the treatment group who had a restart
 interview and a control group who did not have the interview. Survival in this
 context is the time until exit from unemployment and is recorded in months from the
 date at which the restart interview was administered. To examine this we construct
 nonparametric estimates of the survival curves by using the methods of Kaplan and
 Meier (1958). We also use the Mantel test statistic (Mantel, 1966; Cox, 1972) to
 establish whether there is an overall difference in the two curves.
 Fig. 1 plots the survival curves for the terminal event of entering any job including
 part-time jobs or temporary jobs. Since all in our sample are eligible for a restart
 interview they all have experienced at least 6 months unemployment. In all our
 analysis we therefore measure duration of unemployment in months from the date
 that the individual is first identified as being eligible for a restart interview. From
 Fig. 1 we see that the survival curve for the control group lies everywhere above the
 corresponding curve for the treatment group. Not surprisingly, the Mantel statistic
 supports this visual interpretation with a value on the statistic of 2.78 which is
 significant at the 1 % level. The corresponding figure for exits to a full-time job
 lasting at least 3 months is provided in Fig. 2, which clearly shows that for exits to a
 stable job the survival curves for the two groups are more similar. In this case the
 Mantel statistic of 0.96 suggests that the two groups are only different at the 34%
 significance level, i.e. they are not distinct over the whole range of T. This result
 suggests that there is no significant difference between the control and the treatment
 group if we use the exit state of entrance to a stable job.
 So far we have asked whether the two groups differ from one another over the
 entire range of T. However, a more informative approach may be to examine the
 range of time over which the control and treatment group are significantly different
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 Fig. 1. Kaplan-Meier survival curves for duration to any job: 0, treatment group; 1, control group
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 Fig. 2. Kaplan-Meier survival curves for duration to stable job: 0, treatment group; 1, control group
 from one another. The method of Dinse et al. (1993) is appropriate to answer this
 question. To present their statistic we need to introduce some notation.
 Let the treatment and control groups be group 0 and group 1 respectively. Let Tk
 be a positive random variable representing time until exit from unemployment, and
 let Sk(t) = P(Tk > t) denote the survivor function for people in group k (k = 0, 1).
 For group k, let djk represent the number of exits from unemployment to a job at
 time tj and let cjk represent the number of censored observations in the interval of the
 month. Similarly, let rjk denote the number of people at risk of exit at time tj in group
 -~~~~~~~~~~~~
 rjk Z(Cik+ dik) (1)
 i=i
 Let hjk = P(Tk > tjlTk > t11,) denote the probability of surviving past time tj in
 group k, conditional on having survived past time tj_1 where to = 0.
 Kaplan and Meier (1958) derived the maximum likelihood estimates of hjk and
 Sk(t), which are
 hjk = (rik - dik)rik (2)
 Sk (t) =I jk (3)
 {i: ti S t}
 respectively.
 The variance of Sk(t) is usually estimated by using Greenwood's formula:
 Vk (t) = Sk,t2S d, (4)
 Vk(t) = 3kt) E rik(rik -dik)'
 If we approximate the asymptotic distribution of Sk(t) by that of a normal ran-
 dom variable with mean Sk(t) and variance Vk(t), then using the intersection-union
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 Fig. 3. Z(t) versus T for exit to any job (0) and to stable job (A)
 principle Dinse et al. (1993) suggested the following test to distinguish between two
 survivor functions at any specific point:
 SW(t) - SI(t) V{V(t))V=t)(5)
 4{- vo (t) + VI (t)}
 This statistic is plotted in Fig. 3 for each value of T for the alternative definitions
 of the exit state along with its 5% and 2.5% critical values (1.96 and 1.64) on a one-
 tail test. We can see quite clearly that for completing a spell by exit to any job the
 control and treatment groups are significantly different at both the 5% and the 2.5%
 levels for all values of T. In contrast the same plot for the exit to a stable job shows
 that the control and treatment groups can only be considered to be statistically
 different at the 5% level when T = 2. To the extent that the restart programme has
 an effect on the probability of exit to a stable job it occurs within 2 months of the
 interview at the 6-month stage but not thereafter.
 4. ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATION AND ESTIMATION
 To extend this analysis we formally model the duration of unemployment in an
 attempt to establish the existence of a possible restart effect. For this we use a Cox
 proportional hazard specification with unrestricted base-line hazard
 hi(t) = ho(t) exp(X/fo) (6)
 where ho(t) is the base-line hazard at time t (where in our case t is the elapsed time
 from the date that individuals are first identified as eligible for a restart interview), Xi
 is a vector of explanatory variables for individual i, including a variable indicating
 treatment status, and 3 is a vector of unknown parameters. We have dropped the k-
 subscript from the previous section as we now include a dummy regressor variable
 for control group status.
 Following Meyer (1990) we estimate jointly the base-line hazard and the
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 coefficients on the covariates. This semiparametric estimation procedure has the
 advantage of preventing inconsistent estimation of the covariate coefficients due to a
 misspecified base-line hazard and simultaneously providing a semiparametric
 estimate of the base-line hazard. For interval data of the type analysed here,
 where unemployment durations are measured in complete months, the probability of
 observing a complete (uncensored) duration of ti months for individual i with a
 vector of characteristics Xi is
 r ti rT ftj+1
 P(tj s< T < ti + 1)= P{ hi(u) du J hi(u) du < hi(u) du}
 ( ~~tj eS( t,+1 es
 = exp - exp(X//3 E ho(u) du -exp -exp(Xi',3) ho(u) du} (7)
 = [1- exp{- exp(Xi'3) y(tj + 1))] exp {- exp(Xi'3) E -(s)} (8)
 where
 a(s) = J ho(u) du,
 s-1
 T is the actual (unobserved) duration and we use the fact that minus the logarithm of
 the integrated hazard function has (conditional on Xi) an extreme value distri-
 bution with distribution function F(c) = exp{- exp(-c)}. Note that the value of Xi is
 assumed to be constant inside each [s - 1, s) interval. The first term in expression (8)
 measures the probability of an exit in the [ti, ti + 1) interval given that the spell has
 lasted until ti and is therefore the discrete (grouped) interval hazard rate. The second
 term shows the probability of staying unemployed at least until ti, or the survival
 probability P(T > ti). This term will be the contribution to the likelihood function
 of individuals with right-censored spells of unemployment. For the sample of N
 individuals the likelihood can therefore be written as
 N
 Ll(ho, Oi = J L(ti, ci)
 i=1
N t,
 = fi [1- exp{- exp(Xi'3) y(ti + I)1]ci exp - exp(Xi'3) E (s),. (9)
 i= 1 s=1 )
 where ci is the censoring indicator with ci = 1 for a completed (uncensored) spell and
ci = 0 if the duration is right censored at ti. Maximization of the log-likelihood, ln L,
 ith respect to ho (the 7y(s)-terms) and 3, under the constraint that the hazard pieces
7(s) a  non-negative, will provide us with consistent estimates of t e base-lin
 hazard pieces
 ho(u) du
 s-1
 and of the parameter vector:3 (see Meyer (1990) and Narendranathan and Stewart
 (1993)).
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 It is well known that omitted unobserved heterogeneity may lead to selection bias
 in the estimation of the base-line hazard and in the parameter estimates of the
 included explanatory variables. One approach to dealing with this problem is to
 introduce unobserved heterogeneity in the form of an omitted variable vi in the
 heterogeneity term of the hazard function: exp(Xi'3 + vi), with v independent of X.
 Combining this heterogeneity term with the base-line hazard function provides us
 with the conditional hazard function (i.e. conditional on v). However, since v is
 unobservable we must first obtain the unconditional hazard function to carry out the
 estimation. To do this we calculate the joint density of t and v and then integrate over
 v. In this paper we assume that exp v has a gamma distribution with mean 1 (a
 normalization) and variance co. The gamma distribution assumption is a practical
 convenience as there are relatively few tractable distributions which provide a closed
 form solution for the unconditional hazard function. An alternative would be to use
 the Heckman and Singer (1984) nonparametric approach to modelling unobserved
 heterogeneity. Under these assumptions the likelihood is given by
 N ti+1
 L 2(ho, j3, o-2)=1+o-2exp(Xi'0) L (s) c -ci I+ exp(Xi'O) -(s)
 To estimate the effect of the restart programme on duration of unemployment we
 estimate directly the specification in equation (10) for the exit definitions described
 above, assuming that the treatment effect can be captured by including a dummy
 variable for control group membership among the regressors of the hazard function.
 Such models, known as 'frailty models' in the biostatistics literature, could also be
 estimated in the variance components form by using multilevel methods (see
 Goldstein (1995), chapter 9).
 5. ECONOMETRIC ESTIMATES FROM MODEL OF UNEMPLOYMENT
 DURATION
 The results of our estimation for the any job and the stable job distinctions on the
 types of exit are presented in Table 1, with the estimates of the underlying base-line
 hazard presented in Table 2. The estimates in Table 2 highlight the importance of
 using the semiparametric approach in estimating the base-line hazard in that the
 spikes occurring in the hazard make parametric estimation difficult. In particular we
 see that the base-line hazard has two distinct spikes, the first occurring at 1 month (7
 months total unemployment) and the second at 6 months (12 months total
 unemployment). These correspond closely to the timing of the restart interviews and
 suggest that the receipt of such interviews increases the probability of leaving
 unemployment. The hazard function declines rapidly after 6 months (12 months total
 unemployment) suggesting that individuals unemployed for a year or more have little
 chance of obtaining employment.
 The choice of regressors used in the estimation is consistent with those used in
 previous studies and consists of variables which can be thought of as affecting the
 individual's probability of receiving a job offer, as well as those that affect the
 probability that an offer, once received, will be accepted. Of particular interest for
 our analysis is the coefficient on the control variable, which takes the value 1 if the
 individual was a member of the control group excluded from the restart process and
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 TABLE 1
 Estimates from the proportional hazards model, nonparametric base-line hazard and
 gamma unobserved heterogeneity
 Variable Any job Stable job
 Estimate Standard error Estimate Standard error
 Control -0.219t 0.089 -0.117 0.151
 Benefit entitlement -0.097t 0.007 -0.170t 0.015
 Sex 0.170t 0.052 0.583t 0.102
 Age25 0.426t 0.071 0.818t 0.130
 Age35 0.381t 0.079 0.833t 0.149
 Age45 -0.118t 0.076 0.046 0.135
 Age55 -0.672t 0.090 -0.917t 0.164
 Married 2.453t 0.179 4.228t 0.391
 Divorced 0.901t 0.092 1.308t 0.177
 Dependent kids 0.843t 0.069 1.275t 0.136
 Toddlers -0.335t 0.055 -0.288t 0.098
 Local unemployment 1.801t 0.367 2.573t 0.701
 Inner city -0.098 0.057 -0.132 0.099
 Race 0.093 0.155 0.215 0.275
 Education 0.156t 0.044 0.152 0.079
 Driver 0.257t 0.046 0.229t 0.080
 Local authority house 0.572t 0.073 1.176t 0.144
 Rent house 0.757t 0.092 1.391t 0.182
 Other house -0.374 0.197 -0.260 0.314
 Past unemployment -0.461t 0.089 -0.735t 0.162
 Active partner -3.054t 0.246 -5.870t 0.556
 cr2 0.014 0.076 1.723t 0.417
 N 4552 4552
 Log-likelihood -6619.90 -5374.88
 tSignificant at the 5% level.
 TABLE 2
 Base-line hazard estimatest
 Duration Any job Stable job
 Hazard Standard error Hazard Standard error
 1 0.331747 0.009812 0.207357 0.011687
 2 0.121678 0.007928 0.092835 0.01171
 3 0.103805 0.00835 0.078856 0.012333
 4 0.111877 0.010301 0.094935 0.01683
 5 0.116565 0.012233 0.118037 0.023475
 6 0.120773 0.014487 0.125045 0.028279
 7 0.101708 0.014 0.079038 0.020093
 8 0.062473 0.011213 0.05214 0.015374
 9 0.089599 0.016077 0.062374 0.019541
 10 0.079821 0.017079 0.069863 0.023901
 11 0.084183 0.023365 0.047254 0.021668
 12 0.054258 0.027577 0.014206 0.014617
 13  0  
 4 0  0 0
 15  0  
 6 0  0 0
 tOur programme returns zero estimates of the base-line between 13 and 16 months, since there
 are fewer observations at these durations and the conditional probability of exiting unem-
 ployment becomes arbitrarily small.
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 0 otherwise. The results support our earlier findings in that, for the specifications
 relating to the any job durations, individuals who attended a restart interview were
 significantly more likely to exit the state of unemployment than those in the control
 group who were excluded from the process. However, this is not so for the
 specification relating to a stable job. In this specification the coefficient on the control
 dummy is not significantly different from 0 at the 5% level.
 Of the other variables in the model we see that increases in the level of unem-
 ployment benefits significantly reduce the probability of leaving unemployment. Age,
 poor local labour market conditions (local unemployment), previous unemploy-
 ment (past unemployment), lack of formal qualifications (education O) or a driver's
 licence (driver 0) and being female (sex_ 0) all have a significant negative effect on
 the probability of leaving unemployment. We also note that individuals who have
 working partners are significantly less likely to exit the state of unemployment, even
 after controlling for the reduction in benefits that this leads to. If we view non-labour
 income, in this case from one's partner, as a source of financing one's search we can
 interpret this effect in a similar fashion to the benefit effect in that such individuals
 are not under as much pressure to obtain work and thus can be more choosy in the
 type of jobs that they accept.
 To control for unobserved heterogeneity we explicitly assume a gamma form for it
 by maximizing the likelihood given by L2. The coefficient for the heterogeneity term
 is reported as the estimated o2 from equation (10). In the reported results in Table 1
 we see that this heterogeneity parameter is statistically significant at the 5% level in
 the stable job equation. The parameter estimate is insignificant in the any job equa-
 tion. It is not exactly clear what factors explain this result; however, it is possible that
 the lack of unobserved heterogeneity found in the any job exit is due to the fact that
 most unemployed people could be offered a job temporarily when the employers
 know that they can get rid of employees if they prove unsuitable.
 To examine the robustness of our parameter estimates we have also estimated the
 models separately for the control and treatment groups. We found significant
 unobserved heterogeneity within the treatment group but were unable to estimate the
 heterogeneity parameter for the control group. This may be due to the small sample
 size in the control group. In both cases the remaining parameter estimates were
 similar to those presented in Table 1.
 6. CONCLUSION
 This paper has examined the effect of the restart programme on the probability of
 exit from unemployment and the employment prospects of the long-term unem-
 ployed. The experimental data used in this investigation allowed us to study the effect
 of the restart interview on a treatment group (who received the interview as usual)
 relative to a control group (who were not given the interview). The statistical analysis
 proceeded by distinguishing between exit from unemployment to any kind of job,
 including part-time and temporary jobs (any job), and exit to a full-time job lasting
 at least 3 months (stable job). Nonparametric analysis of these distinct definitions of
 the exit state revealed some crucial differences in the effect of the restart interview.
 We found that the control and treatment groups were clearly distinct in terms of the
 Kaplan-Meier survivor function for the any job definition of the exit state but not
 for the stable job definition of the exit state. Further nonparametric analysis of the
This content downloaded from 149.157.61.163 on Wed, 19 Jul 2017 15:42:23 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 286 DOLTON AND O'NEILL [Part 2,
 exact intervals of time over which the treatment and control groups were distinct
 using the test suggested by Dinse et al. (1993) supported this view.
 The econometric model specified in this paper included a Cox proportional
 hazards model which incorporated a nonparametric base-line hazard and a para-
 metric form of unobserved heterogeneity. The estimation results showed that the
 regressor for control group status was statistically significant for the any job exit but
 not for the stable job exit. This supports the finding that the restart interview seems
 to be ineffective in helping the long-term unemployed to gain a permanent regular
 job. The econometric results also suggest that unobserved heterogeneity is present in
 the analysis of the duration to the stable job exit. Although controlling for unob-
 served heterogeneity had little effect on the parameter estimates, the irregular nature
 of the base-line hazard highlighted the importance of the semiparametric approach.
 The main policy relevant finding of this paper is that although the restart pro-
 gramme has succeeded in moving people off the unemployment register to any
 job (which includes short-term, temporary and part-time jobs) it has not been so
 successful in terms of moving people into stable jobs and hence ending their
 dependence on welfare payments. It is possible that our statistical analysis is too
 limited in that it looks only at the distinction between short-term and part-time jobs
 and those which are full time lasting 3 months or more. It could be that, for many
 who have been unemployed for a long time, finding any job, even a short-term
 temporary job, could act as a first step in helping them back to a regular job in the
 long run. This question provides an important direction for future research.
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 APPENDIX A: DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLESt
 Inner city Inner city identifier (1 -inner city)
 Sex Sex (1 male; 0-female)
 Past unemployment Proportion of the individual's working life since 1982 which was spent in unemployment,
 calculated from government data from the Joint Unemployment and Vacancies Operating
 System
 Any job Continued duration of current unemployment spell (months) beyond the sample date and
 ending in an exit to any job: this variable is calculated from self-reported data and months
 spent in training before exiting are netted out; individuals who exit from the labour force
 before finding a job are treated as censored at that date
 Stable job Continued duration of current unemployment spell (months) beyond the sample date and
 ending in an exit to a full-time job lasting at least 3 months: this variable is calculated from
 self-reported data and months spent in training before exiting are netted out; individuals
 who exit from the labour force before finding a job are treated as censored at that date
 Dependent kids Total number of dependent kids (< 16)
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 Toddlers Total number of toddlers ( ? 5)
 Local unemployment For each 1978 job centre travel-to-work area this variable measures the decline in unem-
 ployment between 1988 and 1990 (average local unemployment in 1988 -average local
 unemployment in 1990)
 Control Restart subgroup (1 -control)
 Driver Do you hold a current driver's licence (1 yes)?
 Married Married (1 yes)
 Divorced Divorced/separated/widowed (1 -yes)
 Race Race of respondent (1 -white)
 Education Any academic or technical qualification (1 -yes)?
 Active partner Partner working (full or part time) (1 -yes)
 Benefit entitlement Predicted benefit entitlement
 Rent house Rents a house from a housing association etc. (privately) (1 =-yes)
 Local authority house Rents accommodation from a local authority (1 -yes)
 Own house Own or buying a house on a mortgage
 Other house Other form of accommodation other than home owner, renting from a local authority or
 renting privately (e.g. living rent free or squatting) (1- yes)
 Age25 Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the individual is between 25 and 35 years old; a similar
 definition applies to Age35 and Age45 whereas Age55 indicates individuals 55 years old or
 over
 tThe reference groups for the age and housing dummy variables used in Table 1 were whether the individual was
 aged less than 25 years and whether or not the individual owned their own house.
 TABLE 3
 Summary statistics
 Variable Treatment group Control group
 Mean Standard error Mean Standard error
 Benefit entitlement 43.57 19.20 43.42 18.34
 Sex 0.673 0.469 0.685 0.465
 Age25 0.271 0.445 0.248 0.433
 Age35 0.162 0.368 0.196 0.398
 Age45 0.128 0.334 0.122 0.328
 Age55 0.103 0.304 0.108 0.311
 Married 0.466 0.498 0.451 0.498
 Divorced 0.100 0.301 0.136 0.344
 Dependent kids 0.515 0.963 0.524 1.08
 Toddlers 0.287 0.630 0.266 0.648
 Local unemployment 0.349 0.054 0.348 0.052
 Inner city 0.179 0.383 0.203 0.403
 Race 0.980 0.141 0.972 0.165
 Education 0.558 0.497 0.563 0.497
 Driver 0.496 0.500 0.524 0.500
 Local authority house 0.238 0.426 0.258 0.439
 Rent house 0.096 0.295 0.119 0.324
 Other house 0.013 0.115 0.021 0.144
 Past unemployment 0.392 0.271 0.397 0.268
 Active partner 0.221 0.415 0.248 0.433
 N 4266 286
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